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The United States and the Politicization of the
World Bank: Issues of International Law and Policy
By Bartram S. Brown. London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992,
pp. xvii, 295, $89.90.
Studies of the actual operation of international organizations, particularly the
specialized agencies of the U.N., are modest in number and revelation. Welcome,
therefore, to Professor Brown's study of how the operation of the World Bank
has been affected by the influence of the United States as its chief shareholder
and as the most powerful economic, monetary, and financial power in the world!
His study is especially timely now that the organizations on which international
agreement was reached at the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 will soon
have achieved the maturity of their first half-century.
The broad ambition of the planners of the world that would follow the catastro-
phe of the Second World War was that a general international organization would
resolve international problems of a "political" character that threatened peace,
prosperity, and other forms of wellbeing, and thus would shelter the agencies
with specialized (sometimes called "technical") objectives from the need to deal
with political disturbance or risk. Therefore, John Maynard Keynes, the leader
of the United Kingdom delegation at Bretton Woods, and a planner of genius,
could exhort the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the Bank at their inaugural
meeting at Savannah, Georgia, on March 9, 1946, to be aware that:
If these institutions are to win the full confidence of the suspicious world, it must not
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only be, but appear, that their approach to every problem is absolutely objective and
oecumenical, without prejudice or favour.
Carabosse (the wicked fairy of Tchaikovsky's ballet "The Sleeping Beauty")
should be deprived of the opportunity to pronounce the curse:
You two brats shall grow up politicians; your every thought and act shall have an
arrire-pensie; everything you determine shall not be for its own sake or on its own
merits but because of something else.
The effort was made to forestall this curse by including two provisions in the
Bank's Articles. Article I sets forth the purposes of the Bank and ends with the
sentence: "The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth
above." Article IV, section 10 is headed "Political Activity Prohibited" and
provides that
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor
shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions,
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes
stated in Article I.
The author concludes that these provisions must be respected not only by the
Bank but also by members and executive directors, who collectively constitute
an organ that takes decisions of the Bank.
The author's main theme is the question whether the U.S. has acted in accor-
dance with the mandates of these provisions, and in particular Article IV, section
10, in view of the numerous legislative measures adopted by the U.S. Congress
to get the Bank to act in accordance with the foreign policy or other interests of
the U.S. The legislation requires the executive director appointed by the U.S.
to take positions and cast his votes as directed by the legislation when the Executive
Directors as an organ are considering their decisions on certain issues. The author
dwells also on the question whether the Bank itself has acted improperly either
by succumbing to U.S. pressure in defiance of the Articles or by ignoring doctrines
of public international law not drawn from the Articles.
As the author's primary investigation is into the conduct of the U.S. rather
than that of the Bank, the severe limitations imposed by the practice of secrecy
followed by the Bretton Woods organizations in order to maintain, as they allege,
the confidence of their membership have not prevented him from pursuing his
inquiry. The author complains about this secrecy, but the U.S. publication of
statutes and congressional debates of them have enabled him to write an original
and useful study.
When Keynes spoke of the "full confidence of the suspicious world" he un-
doubtedly included in that suspicious world the public and the community of
scholars. The archives of the Bretton Woods organizations, however, are locked
against scrutiny, although the portals may be opened in response to some requests
for a view of documents and minutes on a defined topic, but even then with
safeguards. Persons who are or have been on the staff, and who can provide the
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information that only insiders can supply as participants in affairs, are subject
to official inhibitions. Readers will note that the author's acknowledgements of
assistance include no names of present or former Bank officials, although there
is a general bow in the direction of many unnamed persons.
An essential problem for the author is the meaning he wishes to attribute to
the ugly word "politicization." He attempts to solve this problem as one of both
political science and law, but neither discipline leads to a precise definition. He
recognizes that an inescapable element in any definition must be that certain
decisions or proposed decisions cannot be reconciled with the purposes of the
organization, but it is not clear whether other elements enter into the definition,
such as intervention in the affairs of the organization by national institutions
like the U.S. Congress or other agencies that are considered "political." The
circularity of including such an additional element is obvious. It is possible that
there are no other intellectually satisfactory elements that can be imported into
a definition. The purposes and procedures of an organization like the Bank are
multilateral, but they do not truly exclude the pursuit by members of individual
advantage. After all, each member joins the organization because of the view
that the benefits will outweigh the burdens, which is simply another way of saying
that a member seeks individual advantage.
The study is not confined to the analysis of actions inconsistent with the Bank's
Articles. It examines also economic actions that are harmful to other states, and
here the problem is to determine whether such actions are illegitimate because
they are inconsistent with established doctrines of international law even when
they are not violations of the treaty. A national prohibition by a state of lending
by entities subject to its jurisdiction to another state and entities subject to its
jurisdiction is an example of such cases. National prohibitions may be the result,
however, of resolutions of a multilateral organization like the U.N. A related
problem considered by the author is whether the Bank should consider itself
bound to comply with a resolution of this character addressed to it specifically
or to states and international organizations in general. The problem is a trouble-
some one because the Bretton Woods institutions are steadfast in the assertion
of their independence and on their right to interpret their own Articles with
finality. Yet, it is difficult for them to ignore the attitude of their membership
on matters involving international order as expressed in decisions of U.N. organs.
An outstanding merit of the book is its indication of numerous legal questions
raised by efforts of the U.S. Congress to influence the Bank by instructing the
U.S.-appointed executive director on the positions he is to take and propagate
and how he must cast his votes on specified issues. The author ventures to provide
answers to the legal questions he has discerned, but these answers are not always
persuasive.
For example, he recognizes that executive directors and not members take the
decisions of the Bank, but the dilemma then is the legal basis for holding members
accountable for decisions or proposals inconsistent with the Articles. He attempts
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to solve this problem by describing executive directors as the "representatives"
of members, even though he acknowledges that in taking their decisions executive
directors must be aware of the interests of the organization and not simply the
interests of members they "represent." Much, therefore, depends on what is
meant by "representation," because the word can have various different mean-
ings, but he does not define his choice.
One possible meaning is that an executive director casts the votes of the member
or members that appoint or elect him and not votes that appertain to him as an
executive director. The Articles, it should be noted, do not describe him as casting
the votes of a member, do not refer to him in any context as a representative,
and say nothing about whether he is subject to instruction or guidance by members.
The Articles make the careful statement that he casts "the number of votes"
allotted to the appointing or electing member or members, which is not the same
as saying that he casts their votes.
The author finds support for his view that executive directors are "representa-
tives" in the provision that a member not entitled to appoint an executive director
may send a "representative" to attend any meeting of the Executive Directors
when a request by the member, or a matter particularly affecting it, is under
consideration. This provision is not evidence for the author's conclusion that,
therefore, all executive directors are "representatives." The word may imply a
difference in the status of executive directors in the sense that although they
should take account of the interests of the organization and not solely the members
that joined in electing him, the representative is exclusively an advocate for the
member that sent him to the meeting of the Executive Directors.
The procedure for interpretation is, of course, necessarily relevant to the topic
of Professor Brown's book. The statement that the provisions of the Bank's and
the IMF's charters are largely parallel is a demonstrable error. They were parallel
originally, but the First Amendment of the IMF's Articles on July 28, 1969,
introduced a substantial departure for the IMF from the original provisions. The
statement that the Bank does not publish its interpretative decisions must now
be qualified, because it has recently begun to publish its authoritative interpreta-
tions, but it remains true that it does not publish a compendium of authoritative
and informal interpretative decisions. The relative size of the two categories of
decisions can be gauged from the fact that the Bank's publication is at present
23 pages in length while the IMF's latest issue (the 18th) runs to 644 pages. A
useful topic for research would be differences between the law and practice of
the two Bretton Woods institutions under their original and their present Articles.
The author concludes that the U.S. has been notoriously unsuccessful in en-
listing the support of other members for the negative positions or abstentions it
takes on loans to target states, although there is no way to determine the effect
of U.S. efforts behind the scenes before a proposal to lend is placed on the agenda
of the Executive Directors. In his opinion, in only three cases can a prima facie
case be made that the Bank has taken decisions to withhold loans for political
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reasons under an initiative of the U.S. or Bank officials. The conduct of the
U.S. that may be questionable has not necessarily been inspired by unadmirable
motives, but it is well known that the road to a certain unwelcome destination
is often paved with good intentions. The author laments the fact that the conduct
of the U.S. has sometimes shown a disrespect for constitutionalism that it would
not tolerate on issues of national law. He recognizes, however, that the positions
taken by the U.S. have done little harm because they have normally been ineffec-
tive, while at the same time helping to placate domestic pressure groups.
The author favors rules for invalidating votes by an executive director in support
of positions inconsistent with the Articles. Such a proposal would raise formidable
legal difficulties, except perhaps if a decision were taken under Article VI, section
2 to suspend the membership of a member that fails to fulfill any of its obligations
to the Bank. Contemplation of such a decision in the case of the U.S. brings to
mind a story of the Duke of Wellington, the Iron Duke who defeated Napoleon.
The formidable Duke was once addressed by an onlooker on some public occasion
as Mr. Smith, thus provoking the response by the Duke "If you believe that,
sir, you will believe anything."
The book includes three helpful annexes. Annex A sets forth extracts from
the Bank's Articles of Agreement; Annex B is a table of selected U.S. legislation
with respect to U.S. policy within the Bank and similar international financial
institutions, which runs to no fewer than 29 entries; Annex C is an analytical
classification of U.S. legislation. A bibliography provides further aid for addi-
tional research. If there are subsequent editions of the book, the author would
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Die Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungshandels am
Beispiel der Versicherungen. Kernelemente
bilateraler und multilateraler Ordnungsrahmen
einschliesslich des GATS [The Liberalization of the
Trade in Services, Especially Insurance Services.
Basic Principles of Bilateral and Multilateral
Regulations Including the GATS]
By Christoph Stadler. Berlin, Germany: Duncker & Humblot, 1992, pp. 412,
DM 148.00.
Trade in services has become the victim of an easily explainable paradox: To
insert services into the GATT framework was among the key motives of the
United States headed for the Uruguay Round; today the United States is among
the major opponents of strict GATT rules on services. The radical change of
attitude has been couched in terms of a rule-oriented versus a power-oriented
approach to international trade. This change is the result of several U.S. success
stories, be they contractual (like the treaties between the United States on the
one hand and Canada or Israel on the other hand) or unilateral (like the section
301 procedures against Korea in the insurance field). Obviously the United States
began to feel that its political power was strong enough and that the contractual
path was burdensome enough to make it more profitable to maintain unilateral
leeway.
This introduction highlights the practical importance of the topic dealt with
in the book under review here. The book is an excellent in-depth report on virtually
all international activities in the field of foreign insurance trade, imbedded into
abundant remarks on international trade law and policy in general.
The value of the book is twofold. The practicing lawyer, especially the insur-
ance lawyer, will use it as a handbook. Besides the GATS negotiations, the reader
will find a thorough presentation of other pertinent multilateral, bilateral, and
unilateral activities. The book not only covers obvious texts like the prolific EEC
law, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, or the OECD activities, but also
such rarities as the protocol on trade in services to the Australia-New Zealand
Closer Economic Relations Agreement of 1988, or the EC-Switzerland Treaty
on the Liberalization of Insurance Trade of 1989. The decision to reprint major
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GATS proposals was helpful, since accessing these texts is, to say the least,
burdensome.
The scientific value of the book lies in its first 100 pages. Here the author
uses the empirical evidence gained from the analysis of the above-mentioned
documents, as well as from theoretical literature, to develop a system of trade
in services. He investigates in turn: the notion of services; the possibilities of
trading them; ways used and purposes sought by the states when impeding interna-
tional trade in services; and instruments employed by treaty makers to overcome
such obstacles. This effort bears double fruit. Part of it is reaped in the book
itself. It enables the author to generate a common analytical grid, valuable for
all the treaties and proposals reviewed therein. These texts thereby become compa-
rable, despite many apparent differences.
It is a pity that the author leaves the remains of the fruit on the tree. For his
grid is not only helpful for descriptive and analytical but also for normative
purposes. Whenever a legal order binds foreign trade policy by substantive rules,
value judgments must follow the same path. This is striking where proportionality
is asked for, as, especially, within the realm of fundamental freedoms and human
rights. One has to know the theoretical possibilities of trade in services in order
to evaluate whether a given state action interferes with freedoms of providers.
The purpose sought and the means employed by the state are the decisive factors
in any assessment of proportionality.
The book is full of valuable insights. To name only a few: While the agent
has to be viewed as part of the provider's business, the broker poses individual
problems (p. 44). The concept of national treatment has to be improved by the
idea of hidden discrimination, and it is useless where the national market is highly
regulated (p. 51). Its force largely depends on whether foreign services are to
be treated equally or only in a similar way. The latter term includes many forms of
different treatment based on the contention that foreign services are substantially
different (p. 82). Market access often must be directly guaranteed in the services
sector, since foreign trade law and municipal law cannot be separated with an
ease similar to trade in goods (p. 83). For the same reason, dispute settlement,
that is, a piecemeal approach, is of outstanding importance (p. 89). Tax law is
a powerful tool to prevent international trade in services, for example by reserving
tax privileges to national providers (p. 65). The infant industry argument can
only be raised where there is the legitimate expectation of a national industry
arising within a reasonable time and at a similar quality (p. 76).
All science rests on the shoulders of its predecessors. This book has the potential
of providing a shoulder for quite a number of successors.
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Soviet Banking and Finance
By Kathleen Woody. Cambridge, England: Woodhead-Faulkner, Ltd., 1990,
pp. 184, $34.95 (pb).
Scholarly work in the West on the history of Soviet financial transactions and
banking is confined to a short list of books.' One of the more recent of these is
Soviet Banking and Finance by Kathleen Woody, an American lawyer and a
specialist in Russian affairs. Woody's book, published before the coup, is remark-
able in its scope and detail of a Soviet financial system gone awry before we all
came to realize this same truth in the aftermath of the coup. Woody's book lays
out the financial and banking issues being addressed now that were not readily
apparent to most of us in 1990, and her remarkable insight is apparent as many
of the concerns addressed in her book have come to fruition, including the contem-
porary issues of debt repayment by the former Soviet government to the West
as well as Western banking concepts as they apply to the former Soviet Union.
For example, she writes about the failure of the socialist credit system to give
real value to its currency, the same problem that underscores the Russian economy
today:
An enterprise that did not repay its credits within the scheduled repayment period received
only the penalty of higher-interest payments to the Gosbank [Russian state bank]. . . . It
was not always a matter of the producing enterprise's desire to meet deadlines. It was
also the lack of materials delivered to enterprises on time to meet unrealistic state-plan
production schedules which caused lateness in production, sale and repayment of the
credit extended. Often enterprises found it more convenient and profitable to bear small
interest and penalties for defective or late plan assignment production than to produce
goods within state-planning schedules .... Many times the penalties that they could
charge supplying enterprises were greater than the combined interest and penalties the
enterprises had to pay their creditor bank and customers. (p. 2)
On the world markets, Soviet Bloc currencies were generally considered soft
currencies that could not be readily accepted by market economies since they
did not reflect free-market trading values and did not have the three main charac-
teristics of money as it is used to facilitate international trade: (1) ease of transfer,
(2) anonymity of payment, and (3) measure of value (p. 75). Before 1990, among
the Soviet Bloc countries, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
operated to facilitate trade. To accomplish this purpose, the CMEA unsuccessfully
sought to establish the transferable ruble as a means of payment with a uniform
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value among the member countries. Its conversion rate, however, was generally
brought about as a matter of self-bargaining. The lack of realistic price structure
and currency valuations were the major elements preventing socialist countries
from entering world markets and obtaining maximum creditworthiness and bar-
gaining power under Western lending criteria.
The author provides a detailed description of the structure of the Soviet banking
system where Gosbank served as its Central Bank with five specialty banks under
its governance, including the 1987 banking reforms brought about by perestroika
that led to the creation of commercial banks. (The author reports that by 1990
there were at least eighty commercial banks in the USSR with assets in the
thousands of millions of rubles.) Underscoring the Soviet banking and financial
system was the Soviet government's continual struggle to find a way to a convert-
ible currency. At one point in this apparently frustrating exercise, Woody notes,
the Soviet government held a national contest for ideas (p. 146).
Woody's book recounts some of the heroes of foresight in the economic woes
of the Soviet Union, including the understated insight of Senator Jack Garn whose
views stood the test of time in contrast to those of Lenin. For example, in his
1982 opening statement during the Senate hearing on Polish debt, Senator Garn
observed the obvious: "[t]he export performance of Soviet Bloc countries is not
better than LDC's [Less Developed Countries]." (p. 82) In contrast, Lenin was
sure the West would lend to Soviet Bloc countries in order to gain access to
fertile markets, preparing for their own suicide (pp. 146-47).
In some respects, the book is dated, particularly in those areas advising Western
bankers on how to conduct trade and business with Soviet Bloc countries and the
USSR, the latter of which does not even exist today. Nevertheless, Woody gives the
reader a detailed awareness of the history of Soviet financial law, the fundamental
structure of which is so different from the West where control of money and credit
is the main means of government intervention in economic affairs. The reader
comes to the understanding that the main function of Soviet banking and finance
was simply to reduce the discretion of operating agencies by depriving them of any
funds to operate unplanned programs. Banks were used to take deposits, account
for figures, and hand out money according to state plans (p. 169).
The book is filled with little nuggets of detailed information. For example:
(On Poland's move to modernize its banks:)
There were only a few bank branches even for the largest Polish cities, which caused
large lines of customers and long waiting times: for example, some bank branches in
Warsaw handled 100,000 accounts. Marion Kenton, President of Bank Polska Kasa
Opieki SA, one of Poland's largest banks, noted that it took a month to clear a cheque.
(p. 169)
(On the effect of the environment on trade and finance:)
A fifth to a quarter of East German farm produce had to be destroyed because of
chemical contamination in the environment... . A quarter of Soviet produce and food
spoiled before it could be transported to consumers, because of inadequate transporta-
tion. (p. 171)
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(Comparing Gorbachev's Perestroika to Lenin's New Economic Policy:)
Gorbachev implemented measures meant to bring about massive restructuring of the
economic system.. . .The changes involved were likened to the USSR's New Economic
Policy (NEP) instituted by Lenin in the 1920s ... instituted to attract Western banking
and business-management expertise as well as technology long enough to gain these
skills from their Western teachers. Once this purpose was accomplished, state-controlled
concessions, licenses and other limited entry to the Soviet Union were cut off. Lenin
died while the NEP was in progress .... One wonders, whether the NEP would have
ended in the dismantling of communism and reintroduction of a modified socialism
instead of a rigid centralized planned command economy. (p. 173)
(On the wasted time and effort of a central command economy:)
The hard-line communist system could not deliver the good life to its people without
subsidy from the West. Before 1990, 30-50 percent of the work hours in many Soviet
Bloc countries were spent preparing production plans and supply plans. Bureaucratic
red tape wasted precious time and assets: time and effort was spent ordering from a
central authority through official channels even where a factory manufacturing a needed
part for a machine was across the street. (p. 174)
The author's sources include the USSR Foreign Trade magazine, published
by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations in six languages, including En-
glish, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), published by the
United States Central Intelligence Agency. (During the Cold War period when
information was often difficult to obtain, the CIA provided an invaluable service
by translating into English available Soviet newspapers and periodicals. FBIS
was often the earliest document source for English translation of important Soviet
laws in their first official legal publication in Izvestia and other Soviet newspa-
pers.)
The topics include a description of the 1990 restructuring reforms, the place
of money in socialist countries, an analysis of loans to Soviet Bloc countries
from Western banks, the new financial environment including country risk analy-
sis, debt repayment to the West, Western banking concepts as they relate to
the former Soviet Union, capital adequacy, the movement away from the state
currency, and the role of Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union in
international banking and finance.
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